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CANNING SPAM: COMPUSERVE, INC. V. CYBER
PROMOTIONS, INC.

"As new technology emerges, the appearance of related
legal issues seems never to be far behind."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Issue of Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail
Messages
The rapid development of the Internet as a source of information and as a means of communication has caused courts
and legislatures to scramble to integrate old legal structures
into a new framework. The characteristic of near-instantaneous
access to millions of subscribers of various Internet service
providers (ISPs) has attracted the attention of commercial advertisers, especially those seeking mass audiences. The Internet
has also fostered the proliferation of electronic mail (e-mail) as
a means of communication. Further, it has attracted the attention of Congress, where there are currently three bills pending
which would restrict or prohibit unsolicited e-mail advertising.2
The Federal Trade Commission also recently directed representatives of the computer industry, marketing companies and
privacy advocates to formulate a voluntary method of dealing
with the increasing volume of these advertising messages.'
A recent case from the Southern District of Ohio addressed
the issue of an online computer service's right to prevent a
commercial advertiser from sending unsolicited e-mail adver1. Lutz Appellate Servs., Inc. v. Curry, 859 F. Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
2. See Victoria Shannon, Advice for Removing Span's Stain from the Screen,
WAH. POST, July 28, 1997 (Washington Business), at 19.
3. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Group Blocks Postings of UUNet Customers, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at C1.
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tisements (junk e-mail) to its subscribers. In CompuServe, Inc.
v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., the service provider's motion for a
preliminary injunction against an advertiser was granted, enjoining the advertiser from sending any unsolicited advertisements to the provider's subscribers.5
B. The Status of the Law Priorto CompuServe
The right of a recipient to refuse receipt of a commercial
communication was upheld in Rowan v. United States Post
Office Department.' The appellants in Rowan, who were in
mail order-related businesses, challenged the constitutionality of
a federal statute,' which required mailers to remove from their
mailing list the name of anyone who requested removal, and to
stop all future mailings to that household.' The United States
Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, stated that "a
mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an
unreceptive addressee."9 The Court found that the postal system had evolved from carrying primarily private communications to carrying mainly unwanted and unsolicited mail." By
prohibiting access to the unwilling recipient, the mailer's right
to send such communications was infringed only when the addressee took the affirmative step of informing the mailer to stop
the mailings. Chief Justice Burger's opinion analogized that to
hold otherwise would be similar to saying that a television or
radio viewer could not change to another station, even if the
viewer found the conveyed message offensive or even boring."
While the statute in Rowan dealt only with "erotically arousing
or sexually provocative" material," the Court said that it gave
the unwilling recipient unlimited power to stop any mailing to
which he or she objected."
4. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
5. See id. at 1028.
6. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
7. Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat.
613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.).
8. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 729; see also 39 U.S.C. § 3008(c) (1994).
9. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37.
10. See id. at 736.
11. See id. at 737.
12. See 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (Supp. IV 1964) (current version at 39 U.S.C. §
3008(a) (1994)).
13. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737 ("[Hie may prohibit the mailing of a dry goods
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A recent state court case upheld the right of a landowner to
prevent a news distributor from continuing to deliver unwanted
newspapers to his property, viewing the unwanted delivery as a
trespass. In Tillman v. DistributionSystems of America, Inc., 4
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held
that once an unwilling recipient requested that delivery of the
newspaper cease, there was no constitutional right on the part
of the publisher or distributor to continue the delivery. The
court stated that constitutional protection of speech had not
eroded a landowner's privacy right to bar certain speech from
his private property. 5
The concept of constitutional protection for commercial speech
is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was not until 1976 that
purely commercial speech was deemed to be deserving of at
least some First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court, in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,'" held that commercial speech, while subject
to some forms of regulation, is entitled to First Amendment
protection. " Content oriented regulation of such speech would
be seen as violative of the First Amendment, but time, place,
and manner regulations, which were content-neutral, would be
upheld.'8
Four years after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court set out a four-part test for determining the validity of governmental regulation of commercial speech. 9 To be
protected, the expression must be lawful and not misleading.
Next, the asserted governmental interest must be substantial. If
the regulation meets both of these tests, the issue then is
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental

catalog because he objects to the contents--or indeed the text of the language touting
the merchandise.").
14. 648 N.Y.S.2d 630 (App. Div. 1996).
15. See id.at 635.
16. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
17. See id. at 770.
18. See id. at 771.
19. See Central Hudson Gas and Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
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interest asserted. Finally, the regulation must not be broader
than necessary to serve that interest."
Paid commercial advertisements, such as those sent by Cyber
Promotions, Inc.,21 have been accorded the status of commercial speech.22 Speech in the form of commercial advertising, although protected by the First Amendment, may receive less
protection than the traditional focus of free speech, which has
been political and social discourse considered to be of public
importance.'
Examples of what has been construed to be protected commercial speech include: advertising by attorneys;24 advertising
by doctors;2 an attorney's advertising referring to her Certified
Public Accountant designation;26 statements of alcohol content
on malt beverage labels; 27 and a beer label that depicts a frog
"giving the finger."'
C. Purpose and Scope of this Casenote
This casenote examines the issues raised by the district
court's decision in CompuServe. In particular, it will analyze
CompuServe's effect on the First Amendment protection of commercial speech in cyberspace. Discussed next is the concept of
what constitutes trespass in cyberspace as defined by this decision. The succeeding section looks at whether the federal prohibition on unsolicited commercial facsimile transmissions might
apply to electronic mail. Next, two cases relevant to

20. See id. at 566.
21. Cyber Promotions is the defendant in CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
22. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
23. See generally Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
24. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 363, 381-82.
25. See Health Sys. Agency v. Virginia State Bd. of Med., 424 F. Supp. 267, 269
(E.D. Va. 1976).
26. See Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142-43
(1994).
27. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355, 359 (10th Cir. 1993), affd sub
nom. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
28. See Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 9697 (2d Cir. 1998).

1998]

COMPUSERVE, INC V. CYBER PROMOTIONS, INC.

549

CompuServe are discussed, and a survey is taken of pending
legislation which could impact future fact situations such as the
one presented in CompuServe. Finally, a prediction is made of
how the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
and the United States Supreme Court might decide probable
appeals.
II. THE DECISION IN COMPUSERVE, INC. V. CYBER
PROMOTIONS, INC.

A. Summary of the Case
The defendants, Cyber Promotions ("Cyber") and its president, were in the business of sending unsolicited e-mail advertisements to Internet users, among them subscribers of plaintiff
CompuServe. CompuServe is a large national provider of online
communication and information services. 9 After numerous
complaints from its subscribers, who were charged for their
time online while reviewing, reading or discarding such advertisements, CompuServe notified Cyber to stop using
CompuServe's equipment to process and store these unsolicited
messages. In addition, CompuServe requested that Cyber cease
sending unsolicited e-mail to CompuServe's subscribers. Cyber
continued to send unsolicited e-mail messages, or "spa,"'°
even increasing the volume sent. CompuServe, in response,
attempted to screen out and block these messages, utilizing a
variety of software programs. The defendants were able to
evade these measures by concealing both the true point-of-ori-

29. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
30. There is apparently some dispute about the origin of the term "spam." The
CompuServe court cites a skit on the British television show Monty Python's Flying
Circus, where the word "spare" is repeated "to the point of absurdity" on a restaurant
menu, as the source of the term. See id. at 1018 n.1. Another source asserts that it
originated from the image of throwing Sparn, a canned meat product, into a fan, with
the resulting pieces being strewn about. See Todd H. Flaming, The Rules of
Cyberspace: Informal Law in a New Jurisdiction, 85 ILL. B.J. 174, 176 n.30 (1997).
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gin information and the domain names used in sending the
messages."'
CompuServe sought and was granted a temporary restraining
order against Cyber by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. CompuServe then
applied to the same court for a preliminary injunction to extend
the temporary restraining order, preventing Cyber from sending
any unsolicited advertisements to CompuServe subscribers. 2
The district court held that CompuServe had a claim for trespass to personal property against Cyber and granted
CompuServe's motion for a preliminary injunction. 3 In regard
to the need for an injunction, CompuServe argued that it had
been harmed by Cyber's trespass in two respects. First,
CompuServe suffered a burden to its computer equipment by
the sheer volume of the e-mail messages sent by Cyber. This
was because the equipment had a defined processing and storage capacity. The processing of Cyber's e-mail slowed
CompuServe's processing of other communications. If the volume continued to increase, CompuServe would be forced to
purchase additional processing equipment. 4 Second,
CompuServe argued that Cyber's advertisements harmed a
legally protected property interest. That property interest was
its reputation and its goodwill with its subscribers. CompuServe
argued that the advertisers were in effect shifting part of the
cost of their advertising to these subscribers, who in turn voiced
their dissatisfaction to CompuServe. 5 This cost was in the
form of charges for the subscriber's time online while accessing
and reading Cyber's e-mail.
CompuServe's cause of action was based on a common law
theory of trespass to chattels. Prior to analyzing this theory,
the court first discussed the common law theory of conversion.
In deciding that conversion did not apply in the instant case,
the court noted that trespass to chattels is an appropriate action where the aggrieved party seeks recovery for interferences

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See
See
See
See
See

CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1019.
id. at 1017.
id. at 1028.
id. at 1022.
id. at 1023.
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with possession of chattels, where the interference was not
significant enough to be classified as a common law conversion." The court found that Cyber had not interfered with
CompuServe's property significantly enough to be considered a
conversion.
Despite finding a relative lack of authority, the district court
concluded that trespass to chattels was an actionable tort under
Ohio law." The court cited The Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Restatement) for the proposition that a trespass to chattels
may be committed by "intermeddling with the chattel of another."38 "Intermeddling" is defined as "intentionally bringing
about a physical contact with the chattel." 9 The court noted
that electronic computer signals have been held to be of a sufficient physical nature to sustain a trespass action. 0 Since it
was clear both that CompuServe had a possessory interest in
its computer systems, and that Cyber had intentionally contacted these systems, the court held that a trespass to chattels had,
in fact, taken place.4 In doing so, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that an actual dispossession or substantial interference with the chattel was required. 2 Under the
Restatement, a showing of harm to something in which the possessor has a legally protected interest suffices for an action
under a trespass to chattels theory."
The court next dealt with the defendant's argument that,
since CompuServe made the voluntary business decision to
connect to the Internet, Cyber was, in essence, a business invitee. As such, CompuServe should not be allowed to later revoke
Cyber's access to the property as a business invitee. The district
court held that, under Ohio law, an invitee's privilege to remain

36. See id. at 1020.
37. See id. at 1021.
38. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (1985)).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at § 217 cmt. e (1985).
40. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021 (citations omitted).

41. See id. at 1021-22.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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could be revoked upon reasonable notification." CompuServe
provided notice twice. First, there was a policy statement displayed online denying unauthorized parties the use of
CompuServe's computer systems to send unsolicited e-mail.
Second, Cyber received actual notice from CompuServe that
their use of these systems to send, unsolicited e-mail was unauthorized and should cease.45
The court then considered whether CompuServe, as an ISP,
could qualify as a public utility so as to allow access by the
public at large. Under Ohio law, an entity's status as a public
utility depends on two primary characteristics. The first is
whether an essential good or service, to which the public has a
legal right, is involved. The second is whether the entity operates essentially as a monopoly in the marketplace.4 '
The court found that neither characteristic was present insofar as CompuServe's provision of Internet access services was
concerned. First, services provided by CompuServe were not
essential, in that there were many alternative means of communication available. Second, CompuServe did not operate as a
monopoly because there were other major ISPs available, and
subscribers could switch between them as they wished. Finally,
the defendants 4had
not, in fact, asserted that CompuServe was
7
a public utility.

The next issue before the CompuServe court was whether
Cyber had a right under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution to send unsolicited commercial e-mail messages through the plaintiffs computer systems. Citing Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Group' and
Hudgens v. NLRB, 49 the court noted that the protection afforded by the First Amendment extends only to action by the federal or state governments, not against private conduct. 0 In
Hurley, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the private
organizers of a parade to exclude certain groups because the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See
See
See
See
515
424
See

id. at 1024.
id.
id. at 1025.
id.
U.S. 557 (1995).
U.S. 507 (1976).
CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1025.
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organizer's action in doing so was considered to be private conduct."' A speaker has the right to choose "not to propound a
particular point of view," and the parade organizers could exclude the group if inclusion would seem to condone the group's
message. 2
In Hudgens, a shopping mall was held not to be the functional equivalent of a municipality solely because it was open to
the public.5 3 Had it been considered such, the striking union
members in Hudgens would have been allowed to picket the
mall retail store owned by the company against whom they
were striking.5 4 More is required, such as some assumption or
exercise of traditional municipal powers, before a private entity
is considered to have the character of a governmental actor for
purposes of First Amendment prohibitions on regulation of
speech.5 5
In a recent action filed by Cyber against America Online,
which is an ISP who provides services similar to those offered
by CompuServe, America Online was held to be a private actor
for First Amendment purposes. " The CompuServe court agreed
with that court's reasoning and found that CompuServe was
also a private actor.5" The court also rejected defendant's contention that, while conceding CompuServe's status as a private
actor, the service provider should be subject to some type of
regulation because it had a degree of control over a central
avenue of communication." Since there were no applicable reg-

51. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566. The respondents, the Irish-American Gay Group
of Boston, had argued in the lower courts that the organizers' actions had the character of state action, but did not include this issue in their briefs filed with the Supreme Court. See id.
52. Id. at 574-75.
53. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520-21.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 516-20.
56. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 443-44
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
57. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1025-26
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
58. See id. at 1026.
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ulations in place at the time, common law principles governed
until such regulations were actually in place.59
The court concluded its analysis of Cyber's First Amendment
claim by noting that CompuServe was the physical recipient of
defendant's messages and was also the owner of the property
on which the trespass occurred."0 Since CompuServe is not a
governmental actor seeking to limit Cyber's attempt to communicate, it may act so as to serve the expressed wishes of its
subscribers not to receive the defendant's unsolicited advertisements.61 The court cited Rowan v. United States Post Office
Department 2 and Tillman v. Distribution Systems of America,
Inc.,' as support for an unwilling recipient's right to stop otherwise protected speech from entering the recipient's private
property."
B. Analysis of the Decision in CompuServe
1. Effect on Free Speech
The CompuServe court confronted the question of the First
Amendment protection given to speech that is solely commercial
in content. As opposed to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.," CompuServe involved no governmental regulation. In Virginia State Board, a
Virginia statute declared that a pharmacist who advertised
prescription drug prices engaged in "unprofessional conduct."'
In CompuServe, on the other hand, Cyber attempted to show
that, although there was no direct governmental action involved, CompuServe had taken on a governmental character or
function. Cyber asserted that CompuServe had assumed the
role of a postmaster by acting as a conduit for communication
and should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The district

59. See id.
60. See id. at 1027.
61. See id.
62. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
63. 648 N.Y.S.2d 630 (App. Div. 1996).
64. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1026-27.
65. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that commercial speech enjoys some First
Amendment protection).
66. See id. at 749-50.
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court rejected this position, noting that Cyber would first need
to show, before asserting this status as a postmaster, that
CompuServe was a state actor, a point which the defendants
never argued. 7
The court also dismissed Cyber's argument that since the
Internet might someday be subject to governmental regulation,
it presently should be treated as actually being regulated.'
The defendants appeared to ask the court to anticipate future
regulations which might be applicable to providers such as
CompuServe. The court declined this invitation, since it would
be impossible to correctly surmise what form such regulations
may take, if indeed they were to materialize. More importantly,
it is not a judicial prerogative to anticipate the future actions of
legislative bodies.
Given the large number of ISPs available from which consumers can choose, there is at present no single dominant provider who is capable of effectively denying a commercial advertiser from gaining access to the Internet for purposes of communicating their messages. Any concerns that consumers may
not have the opportunity to obtain this particular information,
should they desire to do so, because CompuServe denied Cyber
access to its subscribers are undercut by the availability of
other means of communication. ISPs other than CompuServe
are available for dissemination of these messages via the
Internet. Restricted access may become a legitimate concern,
however, if a small number of ISPs come to dominate the market in the future. Should all these ISPs deny companies such
as Cyber access to their subscribers, it is likely that judicial
relief would be warranted to provide access to the commercial
e-mailers.
As stated above, access to CompuServe's subscribers is also
possible through means other than e-mail messages. Advertisements may be placed "through online bulletin boards, web page
advertisements, as well as through more conventional [advertis-

67. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1026.
68. See id.
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ing] means such as the U.S. mail or telemarketing" and regular
mail.69 The CompuServe court rejected the defendant's assertion that the low cost of mass e-mail transmissions made it a
unique means of communication that has no adequate alternative.70
E-mail, however, is a unique means of communication. It
offers a low cost means for reaching a very large audience. ISPs
provide the only current practicable medium for advertisers to
reach a potentially lucrative economic resource. Thus, e-mail is
a low-cost, highly efficient method for commercial enterprises to
distribute advertising.7' In fact, it can be argued that commercial entities have been key players in Internet growth, and, as
such, they should be allowed to reap the benefits of the seeds
they have sown."
In CompuServe, no governmental regulation was used to
prohibit Cyber from transmitting its e-mail advertisements to
CompuServe members. CompuServe is distinguished in this
regard from ACLU v. Reno,7" discussed below, in which provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996' 4 were successfully challenged as unconstitutional. In CompuServe, the
actions of an admittedly private company (CompuServe) were at
issue, a fact which Cyber did not dispute. 5 As is discussed
below, Cyber unsuccessfully attempted to portray CompuServe's
actions as taking on the "character" of the state for First
Amendment analysis purposes.7'
The decision in CompuServe does not disturb existing law
regarding commercial speech. The court rejected any attempt to
paint ISPs as state actors in the current milieu for purposes of
First Amendment protection.7 Regarding access to computer
bulletin boards, it has been suggested that "[c]onstitutionally

69. Id.

70. See id.
71.
sumer
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-mail and the Telephone ConProtection Act of 1991, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1997).
See id.
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afld 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
47 U.S.C. app. § 223(a)-(h) (Supp. I 1998).
See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1026.
See id. at 1026-27.
See id.
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on the state

action requirement."78 The concept that there must be more
than "mere judicial enforcement of neutral trespass laws"79 for
government action to be involved is left undisturbed.
As a private means of communication offering many avenues
of access, the Internet has not yet been the subject of intense
governmental regulation. Should such regulation occur, it is
likely that regulation will be preceded by a legislative determination that the Internet has become so essential as a communications medium as to invoke federal intervention. As one commentator has said, "[o]nly if the [Federal Communications Commission] or the Congress or another governmental entity imposes specific affirmative requirements on private information
service providers is the conduct of the service providers likely to
be sufficient state action to implicate the First Amendment.""0
2. "Public Utility" as Applied to Internet Service Providers
The issue of whether an ISP could be considered a public
utility was addressed by the CompuServe court, even though
Cyber did not specifically argue that point.8 If such status
were found, there would be some right of access by the general
public to the services provided by CompuServe." The hallmark
of a public utility is its engaging in the supplying of goods or
services "of public consequence, such as electricity, gas, water,
transportation, or telephone or telegraph service."83 Ohio law,

as stated above, considers whether goods or services essential to
the general public are involved, and whether the supplier of
these goods or services "occupies a monopolistic or oligopolistic
position in the marketplace.""
78. Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace A Public Forum? Computer Bulletin
Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEO. L.J. 409, 432 (1992).
79. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1026.
80. Henry J. Peritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to
Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 128 (1992).
81. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1025.
82. See 64 An. JUR. 2D Public Utilities § 1 (1972).
83. Id.
84. A&B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. Board of Ravenna Township Trustees, 596
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There were no factual findings presented in CompuServe
which show that Internet access services were considered essential, or that CompuServe dominated the marketplace of access
providers. Defining what a public utility is in Ohio, the Ohio
Supreme Court previously had rejected the claim of a disposal
service seeking status as a public utility for its landfill in order
to be exempt from local zoning codes. The court stated that the
burden of proof is on the entity claiming such status.85
In the present case, CompuServe would likely attempt to disavow such status. Thus, it is unclear whether Cyber would
have been permitted to analogize CompuServe to a public utility. In any event, the lack of evidence demonstrating that the
service offered by CompuServe was essential, or that
CompuServe operated in a monopolistic manner, would seem to
preclude a finding that the company is a public utility under
Ohio law.
Some courts, however, might take a less rigid view of what
comprises a public utility. These courts would not require that
all members of the public have an enforceable right to an
entity's operation before it could be considered a public utility.
These courts look at whether a substantial portion, rather than
all, of the public is being served so as to make its operations a
matter of public concern."
This analysis is somewhat analogous to the argument that
Cyber made in CompuServe. Instead of arguing that
CompuServe was a public utility, Cyber argued that because
CompuServe was so "intimately involved" with the new avenue
of communication, that is the Internet, it should be subject to
"some special form of regulation."" It can be argued that given
the unique character of the Internet as a rapidly growing medium for communication, its operations would be a matter of
public concern. As more and more people come to depend on
the Internet as a primary, if not exclusive, means of both gath-

N.E.2d 423, 425-26 (Ohio 1992).
85. See id. at 425.
86. See Industrial Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 21 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ohio
1939).
87. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1025-26 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
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ering information and communicating, the time when a substantial portion of the public is involved may arrive sooner than
later.
However characterized, both the Internet and ISPs such as
CompuServe will undoubtedly continue to grow exponentially,
as they have in the past decade.88 As personal computers become as plentiful and as commonplace as televisions and telephones in American and international homes, it is probable
that ISPs will be likened to public utilities. As Internet communication becomes increasingly common, it is also likely that it
may take on the "essential" character required to become regulated as a public utility. If, as has happened in other industries
associated with the Internet, 9 a small number of ISPs come to
dominate the market for providing Internet access services due
to mergers, acquisitions, or shakeouts, governmental regulation
is probable. This could be in the form of state public utility
regulation or perhaps through federal antitrust oversight. It
should be noted that at least one long distance telephone service carrier, MCI, is now offering Internet access as part of its
customer services." The provision of such services by traditional utilities may spur the regulation of ISPs by state public
utility regulators.
In another sense, however, the public utility concept may not
be an apt analogy to use when discussing ISPs. With the traditional utility, such as telephone, gas, or electricity, one entity is
given a virtual monopoly to serve customers in a defined geo-

88. "In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the Internet." ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). By 1996,
it was estimated that worldwide, there were more than 9,400,000 linked to the
Internet. See id.
89. Microsoft's chairman Bill Gates recently testified before Congress in regard to
allegations that Microsoft's web browser, included as part of its Windows95 software
package, is dominating the market for web browsers as a result of Microsoft's dominance of the operating system software market. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Competitors, Senators Assail Gates at Hearing,WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1998, at Al.
90. See MCI Advertisement (CNN Headline News broadcast, Mar. 16, 1998). Additionally, Bell Atlantic, a local telephone service provider, is now offering Internet
access services. See Bell Atlantic Advertisement (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 17,
1998).
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graphic area. Part of the rationale is to prevent wasteful competition among providers, where the initial costs in terms of
building the required plants and generating facilities are prohibitively expensive. Because the provision of Internet access
services does not require a physical geographic presence in the
area served, there is no need for the state or locality to provide
a monopolistic economic environment. Indeed, since Internet
users can select any ISP they wish to use, no matter where
they or the ISP are physically located, individual regulation as
a public utility by a particular state becomes problematic. This
same problem may affect federal regulation because the advertisers or the ISP may be located outside of the United
States. 9'
3. What Constitutes Trespass in Cyberspace?
The electronic nature of the domain of cyberspace presents
both conceptual and logical queries for courts where common
law trespass on computer systems or networks is the cause of
action. Absent statutes or regulations drafted specifically to
address computer trespassing, judges must reason by analogy to
case law decided on the basis of traditional notions of trespass
upon real estate or chattels.
The physical act of trespass in cases such as CompuServe is
committed through the intentional, unauthorized transmission
of electronic signals. This element of the cause of action is
unlikely to give the courts conceptual difficulty. It is the determination of the ownership of the interest trespassed upon that
may prove to be more vexing. One observer, in discussing special subject online discussion groups, or "Usenets," asserts that
"Mb]y staking out a particular area of cyberspace for a particular
use . . . , the creators of a discussion group should gain ownership of the space, including the classic hallmark of ownership-the right to exclude others. " "

91. See generally Steven Crist, All Bets Are Off, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 26,
1998, at 82 (regarding attempts to regulate Internet gambling, where the "sports
books" are frequently located in foreign countries).
92. John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 103 (1996).
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There are counter-arguments to this concept that cyberspace
somehow confers different property interests on its users. One
commentator has suggested that, when it is used for the same
purposes as the telephone, mail or fax machine, that is, for
direct communication between people, cyberspace raises no
materially different legal issues than are present in "real"
space." In this view, calls for new or revised legislation to
deal specifically with the Internet may be premature or even
unwarranted. 4
In CompuServe, this concept of ownership is less of a conceptual stretch. The trespass of Cyber was through the instrumentality of CompuServe's equipment. There was no trespass in
cyberspace itself; instead, it was more in the nature of an unauthorized hitchhiking. The trespass involved the unauthorized
access to the means of arriving at the e-mail addresses, rather
than the arrival itself. There might be different considerations
had the action in question been brought by CompuServe's subscribers directly, instead of by CompuServe, the intermediary in
this case. Had Cyber not been notified by CompuServe that its
transmissions were unauthorized, the question becomes whether
the subscribers could have maintained a common law action for
trespass to their e-mail addresses.
The answer would appear to be "yes." Under Rowan, the
right of one who seeks to communicate "must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee."95 The Rowan Court indicates
that regardless of whether the medium used to convey the message is the mail, radio or television, that fact should not affect
the unwilling recipient's right to stop the message where it
enters his home.96 This reasoning is easily applied to the electronic mailbox. An individual's e-mail address serves many of
the same functions as the traditional mailbox. Both the traditional mailbox and the e-mail address are used by the address-

93. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT.
L. REV. 993, 1000 (1994).
94. See id.
95. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
96. See id.
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ee to receive and send communications. Once notice is given to
the sender that the particular addressee does not wish to receive this type of message through their e-mail address, continued transmission to that address appears to satisfy the traditional cause of action for trespass, or trespass to chattels.
4. Does "Spare" Fall Under the Federal Prohibition Against
Junk Faxes?
In Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon denied constitutional
challenges to sections of the Telephone Consumers Protection
Act of 1991 (TCPA).98 The TCPA prohibits sending unsolicited
advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine. The court
voiced concerns, similar to those expressed in CompuServe,
about advertisers shifting part of the cost of their advertising to
unwilling recipients. This cost shifting was in the form of using
the recipient's fax paper to print the message, and also in tying
up the recipient's fax machine while the advertisement was
being received, thus not allowing the recipient the use of the
fax machine during the reception of these faxes. 9 As with email, the relative ease and low cost of distributing a large volume of fax advertisements has drawn substantial interest from
mass marketers.
The factual situations in CompuServe and Destination Ventures are markedly similar. Both involve mass marketing advertisements sent through higher technology devices, received by
mostly unwilling recipients, who are required to bear some
burden in order to receive these advertisements. There are
significant differences, however, which would block applying the
federal ban on junk faxes to junk e-mail. The most obvious
difference is that there is a federal statute,"° which specifically prohibits sending unsolicited advertisements to a telephone
fax machine. While the statute does include computers as being
a prohibited means of sending unsolicited advertisements, the
only prohibited recipient device included within the statutory
97.
98.
99.
100.

844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or. 1994), affd 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995).
47 U.S.C. § 227(bX1XC) (1994).
See Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 636.
47 U.S.C. § 227(bX1)(C) (1994).
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language is a telephone fax machine. 1 ' The Destination Ventures court quotes Congressional testimony that indicated concern with the problem of junk faxes, not with junk e-mail." 2
Given the plain language as to fax machines being the prohibited target device, it is unlikely that this statute could be construed as prohibiting junk e-mail.
Others have suggested, however, that the TCPA could in fact
be applied to junk e-mail. The TCPA's definition of a telephone
facsimile machine can be seen as being broad enough to include
most personal computers.0 3 Even proponents of this view,
however, concede that Congress probably did not intend that
the statute apply to e-mail. 1°'
Not all commercial uses of unsolicited fax messages have
been held to violate the TCPA. A former employee's faxes to his
previous place of employment seeking to hire away the current
employees of that business were held not to be unsolicited advertisements. These faxes did not, in the opinion of the court,
advertise the availability of property, goods or services, as required to be included under the ambit of the TCPA. °5
III. E-MAIL AND THE INTERNET: THE VIEW OF THE
COURTS AND CONGRESS

A. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.05
The analysis of another district court regarding unsolicited email provides a forum in which to analyze CompuServe. Cyber
Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., decided by the United

101. See id.
102. See Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 636-37 (citing Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Telecommun. and Fin., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
103. See Sorkin, supra note 71, at 1013. Sorkin suggests that all that is needed
for a literal compliance with the TCPA's definition of a fax machine is a computer
with a modem, printer, and the appropriate software.
104. See id.
105. See Lutz Appellate Servs., Inc. v. Curry, 859 F. Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (1991)).
106. 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
involved nearly identical facts to CompuServe. In Cyber Promotions, the plaintiff was the same company that was the defendant in CompuServe. Cyber Promotions sued America Online
" 10 7
(AOL) as result of AOL sending a number of "e-mail bombs
to Cyber. Cyber alleged that, because of these "bombings," it
lost the services of three ISPs, who either terminated their
0
relationship or refused to contract with Cyber."'
Among other
claims, Cyber asserted that AOL had violated the First Amendment free speech guarantees. Cyber argued that AOL's conduct
had the character of state action because AOL had opened its
property to the public by performing an essential function and
there were no alternative avenues of communication by which
Cyber's e-mail could reach AOL members.'
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania rejected Cyber's claim of state action by AOL. The
court stated that AOL was not assuming any municipal powers
or performing any essential services." ° Since both parties had
previously stipulated that AOL was a private company, Cyber
was not entitled to First Amendment protection, in that there
was no governmental encroachment."' The court also found
that there were numerous means open for Cyber to send its
advertisements. The World Wide Web allowed access by any
Internet users, including "AOL customers ...
who want to
receive Cyber's e-mail.""' The court also reasoned that Cyber
still had access to members of competing online services, including CompuServe, the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy, as well
as traditional, non-internet avenues of communication."'
The holdings in CompuServe and Cyber Promotions were
nearly identical. This is not unexpected, as the two cases involved a common party. They also involved the same types of
transactions-the broadcast of unsolicited commercial e-mail

107. The "e-mail bombs" occurred when AOL collected all unsolicited e-mail sent by
Cyber to undeliverable AOL addresses, altered the return paths and sent the e-mail
in bulk back to Cyber's ISPs in order to disable the ISPs. See id. at 437 n.1.
108. See id. at 437.
109. See id. at 441-42.
110. See id. at 442.
111. See id. at 441.
112. Id. at 443 (emphasis in original).
113. See id. at 443-44.
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messages. The fact that the conclusions reached by the two
courts are similar is not particularly instructive, since they
dealt with basically the same fact patterns. As such, they duplicate each other without separately defining the parameters for
use by courts ruling on different facts.
In another sense, however, the two cases are helpful. They
stand as a concrete guide to how the districts courts view unsolicited e-mail communications. Should appellate courts believe
that lower courts are misinterpreting the current law, the two
cases likely will serve as an impetus for higher courts to accept
a promising case on appeal and issue a guiding opinion.
B. ACLU v. Reno"
ACLU v. Reno concerned provisions of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996,115 which prohibits communications over

the Internet that might be seen as "indecent" or "patently offensive" to minors. These provisions were challenged as violating
the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."' The provisions were held to be unconstitutional, and a preliminary injunction against their enforcement was
granted. The United States Supreme Court affirmed."'
The decision in ACLU v. Reno, in one sense, represents a
watershed moment in the evolution of Internet communication.
The court recognized that the Internet differs significantly from
other forms of communication." 8 The barriers to entry present
in traditional media, such as television or cable, are not present
in the Internet. Unique to the Internet is the fact that access
does not differ significantly between the listener and speaker;
both are able to gain access and to communicate in basically

114. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2328 (1997).
115. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (1994).
116. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 827.
117. See 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2830 (1997).
118. "The Internet is .. . a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 843.
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the same manner."' The speaker and listener may both enter
cyberspace with relative ease and, by engaging in a dialogue,
may, in essence, trade places.
The decision in ACLU v. Reno, however, may not be particularly applicable to the facts in CompuServe in an illustrative
manner. ACLU v. Reno concentrates its analysis on the
Internet as a whole and devotes little attention specifically to
unsolicited commercial e-mail. The differences between the two
are important. While using the Internet requires an affirmative
act by the listener to access any messages or information, email is more akin to the telephone or facsimile machine. The
latter devices allow a sender, once he or she has the means of
identifying the prospective customer, to make sure the message
reaches its intended destination. The recipient then has to
either respond to the message, or discard or delete any unwanted messages. The Internet user, on the other hand, can choose
not to access any messages at all. E-mail, as a subset of
Internet communication, can be viewed as a more intrusive
form of receiving a company's advertisements when compared to
the voluntary nature of perusing that same company's website.
In addition, public debate differs in regard to the Internet as
a whole and e-mail in particular. As illustrated by ACLU v.
Reno, much of the public and legislative debate on the Internet
centers on its content, whether it is sexually explicit or controversial material such as bomb-making recipes. E-mail, however,
raises concerns more as to the fact or form of the communication itself rather than its content. It is the fact that an advertiser can reach the e-mail addressee without any action on the
addressee's part which is the most objectionable part of unsolicited commercial e-mail. For the Internet, it is the type of material that can be accessed by a willing (often underage) recipient that engenders controversy.
C. Pending Legislation Which Could Affect the CompuServe
Fact Situation
There are currently three bills in Congress which are directly

119. See id. at 843-44.
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applicable to the facts in CompuServe. All three bills propose to
regulate, in varying degrees, unsolicited commercial e-mail.
The first is the Netizen's Protection Act of 1997,1" spon-

sored by Representative Chris Smith (R-N.J.). Smith's bill
would ban outright unsolicited, unwanted e-mail. It would also
require that any commercial e-mail which is sent include the
date and the time the message was sent, and the identity and
return e-mail address of the sender.
The Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of
1997"' is sponsored by Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska).
This bill differs from the Netizen's Protection Act in that it
does not seek to exclude junk e-mail from the Internet. This
bill would require that the first word in the subject line of any
commercial e-mail be "advertisement." It would also require
that all routing information, such as the sender's return address, be valid. Senders also would be required to include their
name, postal and e-mail address, and telephone number. The
bill would impose fines of up to $11,000 per incident. ISPs
would not be liable for such e-mail unless they actually created
it.
The third bill is the Electronic Mailbox Protection Act,"
sponsored by Senator Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.). This bill would
make it illegal to send e-mail- from a false or unregistered domain, or to disguise the e-mail's source. It would also require
senders to remove recipients' names from their mailing lists
upon that person's request, and it would prohibit the sale or
exchange of such person's e-mail address. It is unique among
the three bills in that it provides a private cause of action for
the violation of any e-mail rules which have been adopted by
an Internet standards body.
Of the three bills, Senator Torricelli's may be seen as the
"lesser of three evils" by First Amendment proponents.
Torriceli's bill focuses on the manner in which e-mail is sent,

120. H.R. 1748, 105th Cong. (1997).
121. S. 771, 105th Cong. (1997).
122. S. 875, 105th Cong. (1997).
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while the other two concentrate more on the commercial content of an e-mail message as triggering coverage. It is likely
that any proposed legislation that addresses content would be
subject to constitutional challenge on First Amendment
grounds. Torricelli's bill also forces users and ISPs to bear
much of the costs of compliance. ISPs are required to install
and maintain e-mail filters on their networks.
At last report, Smith's bill was in the House Committee on
Commerce." = The other two bills were in the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation." u
IV. A PREDICTION OF FUTURE COURT ACTION IN COMPUSERVE

Should it reach the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, an appeal of CompuServe would appear to be a
case of first impression. Given that the holdings regarding trespass and the First Amendment protection of commercial speech
do not depart from established case law, the result in
CompuServe is likely to be upheld.
Should this case reach the United States Supreme Court, the
prediction is that, factually, the background situation of the
online information and communication service providers will
have changed. Portions of the Communications Decency Act of
1996," which restricted certain communications over computer networks, were held to be unconstitutional in ACLU v. Reno. "26
' It is likely that Congress may draft similar legislation
that passes constitutional muster. Included in such legislation
may be language which specifically addresses the issue of junk
e-mail, such as was done in regard to junk faxes in the TCPA.
Additionally, if such a case does reach the Supreme Court, one

123. [2 105th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 28,259 (June 13, 1997).
124. [1 105th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 14,193 (June 6, 1997) (tracking S.771); id.
at 14,198 (June 11, 1997) (tracking S.875).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (1994).
126. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). The decision
in ACLU v. Reno is noteworthy for an additional reason. The opinion begins with 123
paragraphs of findings of fact, the first forty-eight stipulated to by the parties, regarding the current status of the Internet. It is recommended as a starting point for
persons desiring a crash course on the Internet.
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of the three bills mentioned above may have become law by
that time.
Absent this congressional action, the Supreme Court will
likely affirm the holding in CompuServe. The question of trespass in cyberspace should be settled by state common law. As
for First Amendment concerns regarding commercial speech, the
Court will find a lack of state action in CompuServe's denial of
access to Cyber, precluding the latter's claim.
V.

CONCLUSION

The ability of an ISP to protect its subscribers from unsolicited e-mail advertisements will likely become an increasingly difficult task. The fact that such a large number of potential customers may be reached immediately at a low cost will draw
ever larger numbers of advertisers to the Internet. The use of
self-help remedies by subscribers, such as blocking commercial
postings, is becoming an increasingly familiar response.127 Of
interest is the fact that even Cyber Promotions is now selling
an e-mail filter." The states are also reacting to unsolicited
commercial e-mail."
The use of a common law trespass cause of action, while
adaptable to property claims in cyberspace, is a less precise tool
of adjudication than legislation which is drafted to deal specifically with questions of electronic access and privacy. The
CompuServe court correctly applied the existing law. Nevertheless, existing law is likely to prove inadequate as advertisers,
providers and subscribers journey deeper into cyberspace. As
online information and communication services become more
127. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 3, at C1 (describing an occasion where almost 80,000 commercial postings to Usenet groups were blocked in 24 hours by an
Internet users group).
128. See Hannah Kinnersley, Net Users, Vendors Strive to Can Spare, COMPUTER
SHOPPER, Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9025571.
129. On July 8, 1997, Nevada passed a law which provides for damages of $10 per
item of unsolicited commercial e-mail. The measure is slated to go into effect in 1998.
See EDGE: WORK-GROUP COMPUTING REP., Aug. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL
12966944.
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available, and as they begin to supplant more traditional methods of communication, regulation on the federal level is an
almost inevitable development, as the pending legislation demonstrates.
Although CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. is a district court case, it does have important ramifications. It is likely that such cases will be arriving at an increasing rate at
courts of appeals and, eventually, the Supreme Court. The
reasoning in CompuServe should serve as guidance as courts
come to grips with the problem of balancing the rights of e-mail
subscribers and the legitimate needs of advertisers to take full
advantage of the unique opportunities offered by the Internet
and electronic mail.
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